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The Department of Energy has been gradually announcing the pieces of
a program to subsidize the industrial development and commercialization
of a number of "non-conventional" energy supplies. Although the size of
this program is yet to be determined, it could easily become enormous in
scope, costing some 10 to 20 billion dollars over the next five years.
Increasingly, this program is being viewed by some as the major instru-
ment of U.S. energy policy, as the Administration relies on it to bridge
the growing gap between our consumption and production of energy.
The particular sources of energy likely to be most heavily subsidized
by this program include oil from shale rock, gas and liquid fuel from coal,
and perhaps breeder reactor technology, although significant subsidies will
also be allocated to solar energy, wind power, and other technologies. The
production of many of these energy sources does not require or represent
fundamental new scientific or technological advances. On the contrary,
shale oil was first produced in Britain in the 1850s, and gaseous and liquid
hydrocarbons were produced from coal in Germany during World War II and are
being produced today in South Africa.
These energy sources are called "non-conventional" because they are pre-
sently not being produced or consumed in significant quantities in the Uni-
ted States, or, for that matter, almost anyplace else. The reason that these
sources are not utilized extensively or being rapidly developed is quite sim-
ple -- they are extremely expensive. It is difficult to pinpoint just how
much more expensive they are than conventional energy supplies, but estimates
that we have examined put them at two or more times the cost, on a thermal-
equivalent basis.
Of course, as conventional energy supplies become increasingly scarce,
and as energy prices rise, shale oil, gasified coal, solar energy and a
variety of other non-conventional sources may someday become commercially
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viable, and in fact may eventually displace conventional oil and natural
gas as major fuels. Exactly when that day will come is difficult to pre-
dict, but if, as the Administration has argued, it is likely to be upon us
in the next decade, why do we not observe the private sector already rapid-
ly gearing up to produce these sources of energy in the absence of federal
subsidies? And more importantly, is it desirable for the government to
spend billions of tax dollars to subsidize these supplies sufficiently to
make them economically attractive to producers and consumers? At a time
when there is growing pressure to limit government expenditures in other
important areas such as health, education, and environment, we must ask
whether these subsidies to specfic energy supply technologies are really
in the public interest.
1. The Plan for Government Involvement
Proposals for government subsidies of non-conventional energy supplies
have taken a variety of forms. First, direct subsidies have been suggested
to reduce the cost and increase the profitability of new energy technologies.
The most common form of direct subsidization is through the use of govern-
ment revenues to finance some fraction (usually greater than 50%) of the
construction of "demonstration plants" for the production of various non-
conventional energy supplies.
A demonstration plant is basically a production facility at or close to
commercial scale, and its construction provides a means of obtaining hard
numbers for the actual cost of each technology and better knowledge about
the operating characteristics of the technology. The information gained
from these plants is primarily useful for evaluating the "commercial" possi-
bilities for the specific technology rather than for obtaining basic and
applied scientific knowledge. Outside of the military and space programs,
where commercial viability is not an issue, the government has traditionally
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focused its R&D expenditures on the financing of basic and applied scien-
tific research, leaving industrial development and commercialization eff-
orts to the private sector where both the benefits and costs of expendi-
tures can be most effectively balanced in the context of commercial realities.
However, the Department of Energy now argues that without direct
government subsidies to finance the construction of demonstration plants,
private firms will face too much uncertainty to allow them to make the
"correct" investments n these technologies. Of course any new technology
involves uncertainty and requires an investment in learning -- the risks
associated with the development of new products and processes have been
recognized in our patent system. Private investors are normally willing to
undertake such projects when the expected rewards from success are greater
than the losses from failure. Yet we are now being told that in the case
of non-conventional energy sources the government should bear much of the
cost and the risk because the private sector is unwilling to do so. We
have not, however, been told why it should be necessary for the taxpayer
to bear these costs if these technologies are indeed such "good bets."
Tax credits are another form of proposed subsidy, though one that is
somewhat less direct. If the production of a particular form of energy is
at all profitable in the long run, tax credits will increase the after-tax
profitability. But even if a particular project is never profitable, tax
credits may have the effect of reducing the overall tax burden to companies
involved in the production of a wide range of energy sources, and thus make
the new technology more attractive.
A umber of tax credits of this type have already been proposed. For
example, the Senate version of the Energy Tax Act of 1978 included a $3 per
barrel credit for shale oil and oil from tar sands, a 50¢ per mcf credit for
geopressurized methane and for any gas from a non-conventional source, and
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residential credits for home insulation and expenditures on solar and wind
energy.1
Shale oil and coal gasification and liquefaction projects typically
have large capital requirements, so that the cost of debt capital is a major
component of total cost. Loan guarantees are currently being discussed as
another indirect form of subsidy. They have been proposed for the financing
of a high BTU-coal gasification demonstration plant, for example. Such gua-
rantees reduce the riskiness of loans, and thereby reduce the interest rates
that companies must offer to attract capital. The cost to the public of this
form of subsidy is difficult to measure, since it depends on the number and
sizes of loans that become subject to default. An extensive program combined
with a high default rate could be very costly.
We have gathered and evaluated cost data for several non-conventional
energy sources, and found that they have only limited prospects of being
profitable. To put it simply, at least for the next several years, conven-
tional sources are likely to be cheaper.2 It is therefore not surprising
that the private sector has not been particularly interested in these supply
technologies without the infusion of government subsidies; indeed, their
development is probably not an efficient use of society's scarce resources.
It would not make sense to invest large sums of money in projects that do not
appear to be economical, unless it can be shown that there are good reasons
why the decisions generated by the private sector are inconsistent with the
1. Only the residential credits, however, were included in the Conference
version of this bill. (Source: Energy Tax Act of 1978, 95th Congress,
2nd Session, Senate Reprint No. 95-1325.)
2. Under our direction, Saman Majd, a graduate student at MIT, has conducted
financial analyses of several non-conventional energy technologies. The re-
sults are described in S. Majd, "Financial Analysis of Non-Conventional
Energy Technologies."
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public interest. In short, if the producers and consumers of energy
who are in the best position to evaluate the commercial value of alter-
native energy supplies are not interested, why should the taxpayer be
forced to overrule these decisions with subsidy incentives?
2. The Rationale for Subsidies
The arguments raised in favor of government participation in non-
conventional energy supplies fall into two categories. The first is
based on the view that the United States is becoming more and more de-
pendent on imported energy from sources that are increasingly insecure,
and the government can reduce this dependence by accelerating the pro-
duction of new domestic energy supplies. The second type of argument says
that projects to produce these energy sources are of a special nature that
makes it difficult or impossible for them to be undertaken by the private
sector without government assistance.
There is no question that the United States is becoming increasingly
dependent on imported energy as the gap between our energy consumption and
our domestic energy production continues to grow. In fact, for some fuels,
such as natural gas, we have experienced outright shortages. The Depart-
ment of Energy recognizes that at current energy prices these new techno-
logies are simply not economically viable, and therefore they can be relied
upon to help bridge the gap between our energy consumption and production
only if they are given massive subsidies. The issue, however, is whether
there are more efficient means of bridging the consumption-production gap
that would end up costing the American public less.
The Department of Energy has also claimed that the special nature of
these technologies is such that government participation in their commer-
cialization would be needed even if energy prices were higher. Proponents
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of this view usually point to the fact that commercialization of these
technologies typically involves large capital expenditures, and in some
cases considerable risk, so that private firms would be unwilling or unable
to raise the necessary capital and make the necessary investments. In eff-
ect, it is argued that there are significant market imperfections which make
the technology look unprofitable to private firms, even though its social
value is considerable, and it is these market imperfections that justify
government intervention.
We will examine these two types of arguments in some detail to deter-
mine whether they should indeed be used to justify the kinds of programs
that the Department of Energy is now proposing. After doing this, we will
present what we see to be the proper role of the government in the commer-
cialization of non-conventional energy supplies, first in the context of an
ideal, or "first-best" energy policy, and then in the context of "second-
best" energy policy, operating under the kinds of political constraints
that are likely to exist in the near future.
3. New Energy Technologies as a Substitute for Imports
Before considering whether the subsidization of non-conventional energy
supplies is a desirable means of reducing the growing gap between domestic
energy consumption and production, we should be clear on just why that gap
exists. U.S. energy policy has for the last several years pursued the goal
of keeping the domestic price of energy well below the world level. Maintain-
ing an artificially low price for consumers -- and domestic producers -- has
the effect of stimulating energy demand, and at the same time reducing domes-
tic production. Some five or six million barrels per day of our current
eight or nine million barrels per day of oil imports is directly attributable
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3to these low price policies.
Two principle policies have been used to maintain a low domestic price
of energy. The first of these is the crude oil price controls-entitlement
program, which basically works by taxing the domestic production of oil (by
holding Its price below the refiner's price) and using the proceeds of the
tax to subsidize imports (thereby reducing the cost of high-priced imported
oil to the refiner). This policy has the effect of keeping the average price
of crude oil to U.S. producers at about fifty percent below the world price,
and has the interesting side effect of putting the United States government
in the business of subsidizing oil imports from OPEC.
The second major policy is the regulation of the wellhead price of
natural gas, which for many years has been held far below the world market
level, and which resulted in domestic shortages of natural well gas before
the 1973 oil embargo. The Natural Gas Act of 1978 represents a major step
in correcting this policy, although gas prices will reach free market levels
only after several more years pass.
Through its commercialization program, the Department of Energy is in
effect now asking taxpayers to finance the difference between the high cost
of producing non-conventional energy supplies in the United States and the
low price that consumers are asked to pay. But Americans are in fact much
worse off with higher taxes than with higher energy prices. Individuals can
choose to avoid paying higher energy prices by limiting their consumption,
but they have no choice regarding the taxes they must pay. A commercialization
program forces consumers to pay a good portion of the high cost of energy in-
3. See R.E. Hall and R.S. Pindyck, "The Conflicting Goals of National
Energy Policy," The Public Interest, Spring 1977.
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directly, through their taxes. As a result, there is little incentive to
conserve, and consumption will grow, as production falls. A growing tax
burden will then be required to finance a growing share of subsidized pro-
duction.
Rather than subsidize higher cost non-conventional energy supplies, it
is preferable to purchase oil and natural gas at home and from abroad at
world market prices. Offering government subsidies of one form or another
to developers of new energy forms means requiring the nation to pay much
more for energy than is necessary. This is exactly what government policy
should avoid.
A counter-argument that is sometimes raised is that the development of
more expensive non-conventional energy supplies should be accelerated today
so that lower cost conventional energy supplies can be saved for future
generations. But this argument is specious because it ignores the time
value of money (reflected in the market interest rate), which makes it
cheaper to consume low cost supplies now and higher cost supplies in the
future. As conventional oil and natural gas reserves are gradually depleted,
the market prices of these resources will rise over time, so that eventually
their use will be replaced by higher cost resources such as shale oil, gasi-
fied coal, and solar energy, which the DOE is essentially trying to "force"
the country to utilize now through government subsidization. To reverse
this order of use by accelerating the commercialization of non-conventional
supplies would only impose an unnecessary cost on the American public.
4. New Energy Technologies and Market Imperfections
We have argued that if a new energy technology does not appear pro-
fitable to the private sector, its development is probably not an efficient
use of society's scarce resources. However, in some situations there may be
-9-
significant market imperfections which make the technology appear unprofit-
able to private firms, while in fact its social value is quite high. It is
only in such a case that some type of government intervention might be desi-
rable.
Let us therefore try to identify potential market imperfections and
evaluate the likelihood that they will bias decisions to invest in new
energy technologies. Those who advocate government intervention often
point directly or indirectly to one or more alleged failures of the market.
Here we examine those alleged failures that have attracted the most attention.
A. Energy Price Imperfections
As a result of past government regulation, most energy prices are
presently below their true marginal social cost. For example, electricity
is priced on the basis of average historical cost which is generally below
marginal or replacement cost, natural gas regulation has kept interstate
prices below the competitive market level, and domestic crude oil regula-
tions have kept the prices of petroleum products below the world market
prices which represent the true costs to the U.S. economy. It is pre-
vailing or expected market prices, however, on which private firms base
their decisions about the profitability of new energy technologies.
Government price regulation has therefore created an important dis-
incentive to investments in new energy technologies. The perception that
such investments are "justified" from a complete analysis of the costs and
benefits to the U.S. economy may be correct, even though private firms do
not find such investments attractive in the face of regulated energy prices
that do not reflect the true social costs of additional consumption to the
U.S. economy. Since energy prices have been kept "too low" we cannot expect
the private market to provide the proper signals vis a vis new sources of
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supply.
While government price regulation clearly leads to an important market
imperfection, it is an artificial one created by the government's own actions.
To set things right the government can either eliminate the source of the
problem by allowing energy prices to rise to replacement cost, or it can try
to "balance" the disincentives created by regulation with additional incen-
tives to new technologies in the form of subsidies. We will explore this
choice further below.
B. Discount Rates Used by Private Firms
It is sometimes argued that private firms, when making investment and
planning decisions, use discount rates that are "too high" and that bias
their decisions away from the kinds of highly capital-intensive projects
that are involved in the commercialization of non-conventional energy sup-
plies. There are essentially three reasons that are cited to explain why
private discount rates tend to be higher than the "social" discount rates
that should be used to properly evaluate the benefit of a project to society.
First, it is argued that social discount rates are lower than private
discount rates because private agents do not value the well-being of future
generations sufficiently. Using a lower social discount rate would lead us
to shift expenditures towards more investment (and less consumption) today
and more consumption tomorrow than would be achieved from purely private
decisions.4
Second, it is argued that market interest rates ordinarily include
some premium for the uncertainty, or risk associated with the investment.
This risk is reflected in (real and nominal) differences in the interest
4. Alternatively, some have argued that we should impute a lower social
discount rate in cost-benefit calculations as a shortcut for accounting
for external economies or public goods characteristics that are not pro-
perly accounted for by private decisions makers.
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rates of risky and safe assets. Proponents of subsidies argue that such
risk premiums would be unnecessary with government investment projects,
since the government is so large and has so many projects .over which it
can diversify risk that its investments could be treated as being riskless.
Government investments would therefore be evaluated at lower interest rates
than those private firms use, reducing their apparent costs and making them
more profitable from a "social" point of view.
Finally, it is argued that corporate taxes distort discount rates,
since the rate of return on private projects must include a provision for
the payment of income and other taxes. According to this argument, because
the government does not have to pay taxes to itself, the social rate of dis-
count would be lower than the private discount rate, making projects "soci-
ally profitable" even though they are unprofitable in the private market.
As far as most new energy technologies are concerned, all three of
these arguments are largely specious. Most of the historical discussion of
social discounting has been conducted in the context of very large capital-
intensive projects (such as dams), with very long lifetimes, with public
goods characteristics and external economies, and which will be owned and
operated by the government. While it is reasonable to assume that these
projects are less risky (and therefore should carry a risk-free interest
rate), these are not the characteristics of most new energy technologies.
There is also little evidence that private firms "overdiscount" the
future by not utilizing the appropriate discount rate, although this is a
question that is really not subject to any kind of objective analysis. In
any case, there is no reason to believe that such an effect would appear
only in energy supply and demand decisions.
While it is true that government bonds will carry a lower interest
rate than other bonds because the government is always expected to pay up,
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this is a reduction in risk from the viewpoint of investors rather than
from the viewpoint of society. If there are inherent risks associated with
the economic viability of new energy technologies, there is little reason to
believe that the government can diversify these risks any better than can the
private capital market. Government debt does not eliminate risk, but only
shifts it from investors to taxpayers.
The only situation in which the government might be in a better posi-
tion to diversify risks than the private capital market is when such ex-
tremely large capital investments are involved that the default risks can-
not be adequately absorbed by a single firm or a consortium of firms. How-
ever, such situations are rare. The investments contemplated for most new
energy technologies are not outside the range of investment projects that
the energy industry has been able to mobilize in the past. For example,
private firms have had little or no trouble in raising the capital necessary
for such projects as the Alaskan pipeline, LNG tankers, oil refineries and
large chemical plants -- projects whose capital requirements were of roughly
the same magnitude as a shale oil or coal gasification plant. If there is a
problem here it is not the result of the size of the individual plant invest-
ments required.
The tax argument is also specious. The capital that might be used by
the government to finance a project has an opportunity cost. That capital
is withdrawn from the private sector, at a cost represented by both the
lost returns from private investments and any lost taxes that such invest-
ments might have generated. From the perspective of opportunity cost we
see that the cost of obtaining funds for public investment projects is equal
to the gross rate of return, including taxes, that are foregone by diverting
this capital from the private sector to the public sector.
Thus, it is difficult to be impressed by arguments that private decision
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makers use a discount rate that is "too high." Let us therefore turn
to the other arguments raised regarding market imperfections.
C. Consumer Perception Imperfections
It has also been argued that consumers use discount rates that are too
high, and therefore pay too much attention to short-run costs of alternatives
(such as initial acquisition cost) and too little attention to the "life-cycle"
costs. If this is true, consumers would be less inclined to purchase such
technologies as solar heating, which have high capital costs but low operating
costs.
There is little clear evidence that consumers indeed tend to overdis-
count in this way.5 In addition, it is difficult to know whether the nature
of the imperfection is due to myopic decision making, or simply bad infor-
mation or an inability to calculate properly the appropriate life-cycle
costs of alternative energy systems.
Despite the lack of confirming evidence, this type of consumer imper-
fection may indeed be of some importance. But this imperfection is relevant
primarily to consumer decisions, and not to producer decisions. It may pro-
vide an argument for providing tax credits or direct subsidies to consumers
for solar energy or home insulation, but this is not at issue with regard to
the types of energy supply technologies that have become the primary object
of the Department of Energy's commercialization programs.
D. Capturing the Benefits of Technological Information
It is often argued that considerable technological information might
be forthcoming from greater research and development efforts, but because
this information is difficult to keep private, the benefits will not all
5. Although a recent study by J. Hausman of M.I.T. does give some evi-
dence of consumer over-discounting.
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accrue to private investors. As a result, private firms will tend to under-
invest in R&D. Alternatively, patent protection might make complete appro-
priability of important technological information possible, but undesirable
because of the distortion caused by resulting monopoly power.
While this argument is generally true for research and development acti-
vities that produce basic scientific and technical knowledge, it is not appli-
cable to the commercialization of new energy technologies. Commercialization
must be kept distinct from basic scientific research. Most new energy tech-
nologies that are candidates for huge subsidies are well understood by po-
tential suppliers, and while there may be some uncertainty as to the ultimate
cost of their use, the uncertainty is no greater than that involved in many
other ventures commonly undertaken by private firms. Thus, while a good case
can be made -- and should be made -- for government funding of basic energy
research activities, the argument does not apply to government funding for
the industrial development and commercialization of particular technologies.
E. Environmental and Other Regulatory Uncertainties
Finally, it is argued that the technological and economic risks assoc-
iated with new energy technologies are overshadowed by uncertainties over
the environmental regulations that these technologies will encounter when
they are developed. Environmental and other public policy controversies sur-
rounding the Clinch River Breeder Reactor and the Barnwell Reprocessing Plant
are examples of the kinds of outcomes that potential investors fear.
Uncertainties over the ability to meet current and future environmental
standards are faced by many industrial investments, but regulatory uncertainty
is probably greater for such energy technologies as shale oil and coal gasifi-
cation. These technologies raise new and different environmental questions,
and to the extent that environmental standards may not be promulgated until
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they are operational, there may indeed by significantly greater regulatory
uncertainty.
The environmental problems associated with shale oil production and
coal gasification and liquefaction fall into three main areas: air quality,
land, and water. Air quality problems can occur because of plant emissions
and fugitive dust. The plants and mines associated with coal technologies
and the disposal of spent shale in the production of shale oil may result
in serious scarring of the landscape.6 Finally, the development of these
technologies raises concern over the availability of adequate water supplies
and the pollution of existing sources.7
It has been argued that understanding and solving the environmental
problems associated with new energy technologies may require the technology
to operate for some period of time. While this would provide the information
needed to draw up regulations, without clearly defined regulations the tech-
nology may not be developed because of the associated uncertainties. To the
extent that this dilemma exists, the construction and operation of first-of-
a-kind facilities may have public goods characteristics that would justify
6. The use of the land for these plants may permanently alter land use in
the area, possibly destroying vegetation and wildlife (e.g. in the case of
coal based synfuels in the Appalachian regions, agricultural and forest
lands would be unavailable for other uses, and reclamation would not to-
tally restore them to their original use). Reclamation and revegetation
would be extremely difficult in areas of low precipitation.
7. Synthetic fuels production requires large quantities of water at the
sites, and in some regions this would mean a shortage of water for other
uses (e.g. for agriculture). Discharge of pollutants into surface streams
and leaching into underground sources are dealt with at the planning stage
by designing the plants for "zero-discharge," involving recycling of the
spent water for use at the plant site. Whether or not the discharge is
quite "zero" during full scale operations remains to be seen.
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some form of government intervention. On the other hand, regulatory re-
form, leading to the removal of unnecessary and even counterproductive
regulations, and a clarification of the kinds of environmental standards
that are likely to be enforced in the future, is likely to be a much more
effective way of dealing with this kind of market imperfection.
5. The Proper Role of the Government
The gap between the consumption and production of energy in the
United States is indeed growing rapidly, and non-conventional energy
supplies may soon be relied on to help close that gap. This would in-
deed be unfortunate. Most of the gap is due to price controls on crude
oil, natural gas and electricity, and it would be much more effective and
much less costly to the American public to deal with that gap by elimina-
ting its source, rather than by subsidizing expensive energy substitutes.
For this reason, the most important component of a sensible national
energy policy is the elimination of domestic energy price controls. Eli-
minating price controls would enable us to begin utilizing non-conventional
energy supplies only as they become economically viable.
Of the various forms of market imperfections that have been put forth
as reasons for government intervention, the most real and most serious is
uncertainty over future regulation. Earlier we discussed uncertainty over
future environmental constraints and regulations, but of even greater con-
cern to the potential producer of new energy technologies is uncertainty
over future government price regulation.
The commercialization of,say, shale oil is indeed a risky venture,
but if private firms do undertake such a venture it will only be because
they see a potential for profits -- profits large enough to warrant the
considerable risk. The fear of private firms, however, is that while they
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will be permitted to lose almost any amount of money, they will not be per-
mitted to make almost any amount of money. Firms considering shale oil pro-
jects rightly fear that should the world price of conventional oil rise con-
siderably over the next decade so that a shale oil facility does turn out to
be an economic success, the government would probably regulate the price of
the shale oil they produce reducing the profits that could be earned.
Private firms usually have no problem with downside risk as long as
there is a commensurate potential for profit on the upside. The problem
with non-conventional energy supplies is that firms are unwilling to take
downside risk when they perceive a probable government ceiling on their
upside potential. It is therefore not surprising that these firms are
asking for various forms of government subsidies to limit their downside
risk.
.Once again, government subsidies are a costly and unnecessary alter-
native to dealing with the problem directly. The removal of price controls
-- and the guarantee that controls will not be imposed on the prices of non-
conventional energy supplies produced by the private sector in the future --
would eliminate the one form of market imperfection that is indeed signifi-
cant and serious.
The removal of controls on the current and future prices of energy
supplies is the most important part of a "first-best" energy policy. This,
together with a revision of those environmental regulations that are unnec-
essary and unreasonable, and the clarification of environmental standards
and regulations that would apply in the future, would permit private firms
to develop new energy technologies at a socially optimal rate. There would
then be little or no need for the government to subsidize the commerciali-
zation of these technologies. While we would hope to see continued govern-
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ment support for basic energy research, subsidies for the production of
non-conventional energy supplies would be no more warranted than subsidies
for the production of sugar, peanuts, tobacco, or any other good.
While we do not believe it to be the case, some have argued that the
deregulation of domestic energy prices is politically impossible, at least
over the next several years. If this is true, would it make government
subsidies for new energy technologies desirable? In particular, what role
should the government play in the commercialization of these technologies
as part of a "second-best" energy policy?
In this case, the government should use its limited resources to re-
duce the cost (or, equivalently, the risk) of producing non-conventional
energy supplies, but should avoid in any way determining the specific tech-
nologies that are developed. An especially attractive way to do this would
be for the government to provide price guarantees or purchase agreements
for broad categories of non-conventional energy supplies, rather than sub-
sidizing specific demonstration plants or technologies directly. For example,
the federal government might announce that it is willing to buy a million bar-
rels per day (or equivalent) of liquid or gaseous fuels produced from coal or
shale at some fixed price above the current market price. The government
would not itself pick a particular process or demonstration plant or get in-
volved in technological decisions or production activities. Rather, it would
provide an incentive for the private sector to pursue the development of the
most cost effective technologies.
It is private industry, and not the government, that is in the best
position to determine which new technologies are most economical and most
promising, and to manage the commercialization of those technologies. In
addition, private industry is much better able than government bureaucracies
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to drop the development of a particular project if it later turns out that
the technology is not as promising as it once appeared. By choosing a par-
ticular plant located in a particular congressional district and creating a
government bureaucracy to manage the project, we inevitably create a set of
political forces which makes termination of the project very difficult.
Nor is there any reason to believe that the personnel in government agencies
are in a particularly good position to sensibly evaluate all of the proposals
that are always put foward when government subsidies become available. We
should never repeat the mistake made in our breeder reactor program by giving
the government a primary role in choosing among programs or managing any par-
ticular program. By using broad price and purchase guarantees we can avoid
finding ourselves in the position of being committed to a technology that
appears less and less desirable as time goes on.
To the extent that the government does participate in commercialization,
its role should be strictly limited to the most efficient subsidization of
alternative energy supplies in general, rather than particular technologies
and programs. But we must recognize that this "second-best" policy will
still be far more costly to the American public than the "first-best" policy,
which largely eliminates the need for government participation in the produc-
tion of energy in the first place.
